The relationship between mens rea and criminal psychology

The necessity that a defendant should have had a specific frame of mind at the time the crime was committed is known as mens rea, or guilty mind. The appropriate criminal click here statute will typically use one of the following phrases to describe the mens rea element of a crime, namely, intent, purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence.

Most criminal laws merely need a broad or objective mens rea standard, where the question is whether a reasonable person would have understood that the act would be harmful. The defendant must have known that they were behaving, but not that any specific criminal consequences would follow from their action, in order to be found guilty of a so-called general-intent crime; this is typically referred to as “recklessness” or “negligence.” The prosecution is exempted from having to consider the defendant’s mental state in order to satisfy this criterion.

For some crimes, the prosecution must prove that the defendant truly knew or intended that specific harm would follow from their actions, a requirement known as a showing of specific or subjective mens rea. Specific or subjective mens rea is typically reserved for more serious offences with more severe punishments because this might be difficult to prove.

As a person’s mental condition is unimportant to the question of general or objective mens rea, evidence of mental disease is rarely permitted in these situations. On the other hand, some states allow the submission of mental disorder evidence if it is rationally pertinent to challenge the objective or particular mens rea requirement (i.e., the state of mind associated with a specific-intent crime). If this defence (also known as diminished capacity) is successful, the defendant is often only concerned about being found guilty of a lesser charge that only calls for proof of general or objective intent.

In order to be able to punish the defendant if they are unable to persuade the judge or jury that the required particular intent existed at the time of the offence, prosecutors who charge a person with a specific-intent crime usually additionally charge the defendant with a general-intent crime.

The use of evidence of a mental disorder in discounting the existence of a specific purpose differs from the use of evidence of a mental disorder for an insanity defence in that the former can result in an unconditional acquittal and the latter often results in civil commitment and treatment.

Because, as stated above, both mens rea and actus reus are parts of the crime that must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, if they cannot be proven, the defendant will be exonerated of the charged crime. This outcome is the same as that which occurs from a lack of actus reus.

The use of expert testimony about mental diseases has frequently been prohibited by courts and legislators. For instance, testimony based on any indication of a mental disorder is prohibited in some jurisdictions unless it is being used to bolster an insanity defence.

In Clark v. Arizona (2006), the Supreme Court maintained this approach, holding that Arizona did not violate due process by limiting the admissibility of evidence of mental disease to just insanity claims and excluding such evidence when it could be used to address mens rea. However, even in areas where mens rea experts cannot testify in court, the details of a defendant’s mental condition may still be discussed during plea talks and before sentencing.